In the literature three mechanisms are commonly distinguished to make decisions about the care of incompetent patients: A living will, a substituted judgment by a surrogate, and a best interest judgment. Almost universally, the third mechanism is deemed the worst possible of the three, to be invoked only when the former two are unavailable. In this article, I argue in favor of best interest judgments. The evermore common aversion of best interest judgments entails a risk that health care providers withdraw (...) from the decision-making process, abandoning patients to these most difficult of decisions about life and death. My approach in this article is primarily negative, that is, I criticize the alleged superiority of the living will and substituted judgment. The latter two mechanisms gain their alleged superiority because they are supposedly morally neutral, whereas the best interest judgment entails a value judgment on behalf of the patient. I argue that on closer inspection living wills and substituted judgments are not morally neutral; indeed, they generally rely on best interest judgments, even if those are not made explicit. (shrink)

En los Países Bajos, tanto los pacientes psiquiátricos involuntarios como los voluntarios tienen derecho a recibir apoyo individual de un abogado del paciente. Desde 1982, el apoyo de los defensores de los pacientes ha sido organizado y facilitado por la Fundación Nacional Holandesa para los Defensores de los Pacientes en la Atención de la Salud Mental. La forma en que los defensores tienen que llevar a cabo sus tareas jurídicas se ha traducido en normas de conducta elaboradas por la mencionada (...) Fundación. Algunas piedras angulares del modelo holandés son la independencia del hospital psiquiátrico, la buena accesibilidad, la confidencialidad, la receptividad a las preguntas y quejas del paciente, la orientación sobre la posición jurídica del paciente individual, la parcialidad, la representación de los intereses de atención del paciente según su experiencia y el requisito del consentimiento a las acciones del defensor. La combinación de estas piedras angulares resulta en un papel muy específico para el defensor del paciente. El modelo holandés asume que este papel encaja bien con el de otros actores de la salud y que las leyes de salud son justas. El valor de esa defensa del paciente depende de la medida en que se cumplan esos dos supuestos. Se pueden hacer preguntas críticas sobre el ajuste en cuestión y la calidad de la justicia positiva. (shrink)

The principle of autonomy presupposes Patient Decision Making Competence (PDMC). For a few decades a considerable amount of empirical research has been done into PDMC. In this contribution that research is explored. After a short exposition on four qualities involved in PDMC, different approaches to assess PDMC are distinguished, namely a negative and a positive one. In the negative approach the focus is on identifying psychopathologic conditions that impair sound decision making; the positive one attempts to assess whether a patient (...) actually has the required abilities and qualities. Characteristic of the latter approach is the use of (or development of) test-like instruments for PDMC assessment. Some of these tests are discussed and commented on. Although they may be useful in investigating aspects of PDMC, none of the described approaches and tests offers a reliable and valid method for PDMC assessment. In response to a potential misuse of tests, the concept of a supportive situation is briefly introduced in order to draw attention to the risk of prematurely deeming patients incompetent on the basis of low test scores, whereas their insufficient performance may be (partly) attributable to alack of situational support. Also, the need for and possibility of an emotionalist concept of PDMC are suggested, as an alternative to the more common rationalist one. In this regard,the legitimacy of competence being conceived as a presumption or fiction of law, deserves further investigation. (shrink)

In order to protect patients against medical paternalism, patients have been granted the right to respect of their autonomy. This right is operationalized first and foremost through the phenomenon of informed consent. If the patient withholds consent, medical treatment, including life-saving treatment, may not be provided. However, there is one proviso: The patient must be competent to realize his autonomy and reach a decision about his own care that reflects that autonomy. Since one of the most important patient rights hinges (...) on the patient's competence, it is crucially important that patient decision making incompetence is clearly defined and can be diagnosed with the greatest possible degree of sensitivity and, even more important, specificity. Unfortunately, the reality is quite different. There is little consensus in the scientific literature and even less among clinicians and in the law as to what competence exactly means, let alone how it can be diagnosed reliably. And yet, patients are deemed incompetent on a daily basis, losing the right to respect of their autonomy. In this article, we set out to fill that hiatus by beginning at the very beginning, the literal meaning of the term competence. We suggest a generic definition of competence and derive four necessary conditions of competence. We then transpose this definition to the health care context and discuss patient decision making competence. (shrink)